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Abstract. We consider the problem of finding cryptographically suitable Ja-
cobians. By applying a probabilistic generic algorithm to compute the zeta
functions of low genus curves drawn from an arbitrary family, we can search
for Jacobians containing a large subgroup of prime order. For a suitable distri-
bution of curves, the complexity is subexponential in genus 2, and O(N1/12)
in genus 3. We give examples of genus 2 and genus 3 hyperelliptic curves over
prime fields with group orders over 180 bits in size, improving previous results.
Our approach is particularly effective over low-degree extension fields, where
in genus 2 we find Jacobians over Fp2 and trace zero varieties over Fp3 with
near-prime orders up to 372 bits in size. For p = 261 − 1, the average time to
find a group with 244-bit near-prime order is under an hour on a PC.
1. Introduction
Algebraic curves over finite fields have proven to be a fertile source of groups
for cryptographic applications based on the discrete logarithm problem. This has
spurred the development of highly efficient algorithms for group computation that
are now available for many types of curves, including hyperelliptic, superelliptic,
Picard, and Cab curves [2, 3, 19, 20, 26, 33, 37, 66]. The group of interest consists
of the Fq-rational points on the Jacobian variety of a curve C, or, equivalently, the
divisor class group of degree 0, Pic0(C). We denote this group J(C/Fq), or simply
J(C), and call it the Jacobian of C.
For cryptographic use one typically seeks Jacobians with near-prime orders in
the range 2160 to 2256, and we also consider subgroups of Jacobians that offer
comparable (perhaps superior) performance and security parameters, such as trace
zero varieties [11, 21, 36]. The existence of various index calculus algorithms has
centered attention on hyperelliptic curves of genus g ≤ 3 [15, 18, 24]. We similarly
focus on the hyperelliptic case, although our results may be applied to any family
of low genus curves.
To assess the cryptographic suitability of a group, it is necessary to know its
order. For curves of genus 1 (elliptic curves), several effective point-counting al-
gorithms are available. The most general are ℓ-adic methods, based on Schoof’s
algorithm [51, 52], and for small characteristic fields there are more efficient p-adic
methods [31, 32, 43, 49]. The p-adic methods, particularly Kedlaya’s algorithm
[31], readily extend to higher genus curves, and have proven effective over small
and medium characteristic fields [28, 62]. Generalization of the ℓ-adic methods has
been more difficult. The best results for genus 2 curves over prime fields report
roughly a week to compute the order of a group of size ≈ 2164 [27]. In genus 3,
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no effective ℓ-adic methods are available, however, recent work on extending p-adic
methods to larger characteristic fields has enabled computation of group orders up
to size ≈ 2150 over prime fields [5, 30]. In both cases the algorithms are memory
intensive, limiting their applicability to larger groups. There are other methods for
curves with special properties [22, 64, 65], but for general curves of genus g > 1
over large characteristic fields, efficiently finding cryptographically suitable Jaco-
bians remains an open problem [11, 38].1
The solution we propose is probabilistic. As a point-counting algorithm, it usu-
ally fails. However, given a suitably diverse family of curves, it succeeds often
enough to be effective as a search algorithm, with (heuristically) sub-exponential
performance. One can then search for curves with a desired property, such as
cryptographic suitability.
2. Overview
We apply neither ℓ-adic nor p-adic methods, relying instead on generic algo-
rithms. These perform group computations in a representation-independent man-
ner, needing only a “black box” to implement the group law. As a result of the
work cited above, we have many highly efficient black boxes at our disposal.
The Θ(
√
N) complexity of birthday-paradox algorithms, such as Pollard’s rho
method [48] and Shanks’ baby-steps giant-steps algorithm [53], makes them too slow
to effectively compute the order of a large group, even when fairly tight bounds on
the order are known (as in [56]). Alternatively, one may apply a generic version of
Pollard’s p− 1 technique [47], exponentiating by many small primes. This can be
quite effective if the group order happens to be smooth (no large prime factors),
but the worst case complexity is Θ(N).
Surprisingly, a combination of these two generic approaches is faster than either
alone. The author’s thesis [57] presents a o(
√
N) algorithm to compute the order of
an element in any finite group. For a family of abelian groups with orders uniformly
distributed over a large interval, the average running time is O(
√
N/ logN). This
average is dominated by a o(1) fraction of worst cases (groups of prime order). The
median complexity is O(N0.344), and when the group order is highly composite, the
algorithm is very fast. By applying a bounded amount of computation to each group
in a family, we can hope to find one whose order is easily computed. This approach
is similar to some algorithms for integer factorization [39, 50], and has been success-
fully applied to compute ideal class groups of imaginary quadratic number fields
with 100-digit discriminants. For a suitable distribution of group orders, the com-
plexity is subexponential: L(1/2,
√
2) = O
(
exp
[(√
2 + o(1)
)
(logN log logN)1/2
])
.
The ability to quickly find a group with highly composite order would seem
little use in the search for cryptographically suitable groups, as this is precisely the
opposite of what is desired. However, the order of one Jacobian may be used to
compute the orders of several others. For low genus curves, given #J(C), we can
readily recover the zeta function of C (3.1) via the L-polynomial P (z) that appears
in its numerator. This process is trivial in genus 1, almost trivial in genus 2, and
in genus 3 we give a generic algorithm requiring O(N1/12) group operations.2
1There is a polynomial-time ℓ-adic algorithm due to Pila for arbitrary abelian varieties [46],
but it is not practical for groups of cryptographic size.
2This is asymptotically exponential, but negligible for the size groups we consider.
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With P (z) in hand, we can compute the order of Jd(C) = J(C/Fqd) for any
degree d extension field (Lemma 1). When b divides a, the abelian group Jb(C) is
a subgroup of Ja(C), and we consider groups of the form
(2.1) Ja/b(C) ∼= Ja(C)/Jb(C).
When C is hyperelliptic, J2/1(C) is isomorphic to J(C˜), where C˜ is the quadratic
twist of the curve C over Fq (Lemma 3). In general, Ja/b need not correspond to the
Jacobian of a curve, however, we can compute in Ja/b(C) using the group operation
of Ja(C). The group Ja/1(C) corresponds to a trace zero variety (Lemma 2). As
noted by Lange, computation in the trace zero variety is typically more efficient
than computation in a Jacobian of comparable size and genus, due to optimizations
enabled by the Frobenius endomorphism [36].
The shape of the integer #Ja/b(C) is not particularly correlated with #J(C),
and it is possible that the former may be near prime while the latter is quite
smooth (Table 2). We should remark that this situation is not believed to diminish
the security of the group Ja/b(C). Indeed, most of the elliptic curves in the NIST
Digital Signature Standard [45], and nearly all the Certicom challenge curves [12],
have relatively insecure quadratic twists.3
When considering the cryptographic use of Jacobians over extension fields, one
must take into account the existence of transfers (cover attacks) which may reduce
their effective security (Proposition 1). For hyperelliptic curves in genus 3 this
essentially limits us to J2/1(C) ∼= J(C˜) over a prime field. For genus 2 curves,
however, there are four groups with potentially competitive performance/security
ratios when q is prime:
(2.2) J2/1(C) ∼= J(C˜), J3/1(C), J3/1(C˜), J4/2(C) ∼= J(C˜2).
Here C˜ is the quadratic twist of C in Fq and C˜2 is the quadratic twist in Fq2 . The
group J(C˜) has size ≈ q2, while the last three groups are each of size ≈ q4.
To give a brief example, we used this approach on a family of 106 random curves
over Fp, with p = 2
61−1 implying #J(C) ≈ 2122. For suitably chosen parameters, a
single PC (2.5 GHz AMD Athlon-64) test about two curves per second, successfully
computing #J(C) for some curve in the family every four or five minutes on average.
We computed the zeta functions of some 2000 curves, finding 220 groups with
244-bit near-prime orders (cofactor < 5% of the bits), including many of prime
order. For cryptographic use, most of these groups should be compared to genus 2
Jacobians over a prime field with a group size of 180 to 200 bits (Proposition 1).
Depending on the implementation, they may offer superior performance.
More detailed examples are provided in Section 6, including results for much
larger groups. We have successfully applied this approach over prime fields with
#J(C) up to 186 bits in genus 2, and 183 bits in genus 3, improving previous bests
of 164 bits (Gaudry and Schost [27]) and 150 bits (Harvey [30]). We note, however,
that while our method computes zeta functions of curves drawn from an arbitrary
family, it will likely fail on any particular curve and should be distinguished from
point-counting algorithms. The new algorithm is faster, less memory intensive, and
well suited to distributed implementation.
3In particular, the order of the twist of the Certicom curve ECCp-163 contains no prime factors
larger than 256. Discrete logarithms in the twist can be computed in well under an hour on a
typical PC, yet the US$30,000 cash prize remains unclaimed after nearly a decade.
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3. Mathematical Background
For a projective curve C defined over Fq, let Nk count the points on C in P(Fqk).
The zeta function of C is the formal power series
(3.1) Z(C/Fq, z) = exp
(
∞∑
k=1
Nkz
k/k
)
.
Our interest in the zeta function stems from the well-known theorem of Weil [63],
which we restrict here to projective curves defined over Fq. Henceforth we assume
all curves are non-singular and irreducible over the algebraic closure Fq.
Theorem 1 (Weil). Let C be a genus g curve defined over Fq.
(1) Z(C/Fq, z) = P (z)/ [(1− z)(1− qz)] , where P (z) =
∑2g
i=0 aiz
i has integer
coefficients satisfying a0 = 1 and a2g−i = q
g−iai, for 0 ≤ i < g.
(2) P (z) =
∏2g
i=1(1− αiz), with |αi| =
√
q.
(3) Nk = q
k + 1−∑2gi=1 αki .
A proof can be found in chapters 8 and 10 of [40]. We call P (z) the L-polynomial
of the curve C. From (2) we obtain the bounds
(3.2) |ai| ≤
(
2g
i
)
qi/2.
Let J(C/Fqk) denote the group of Fqk -rational points on the Jacobian variety of C.
We write Jk(C) for J(C/Fqk), and J(C) for J(C/Fq), when Fq is understood.
Lemma 1. Let C and P (z) be as in Theorem 1. Then
#Jk(C) =
k∏
i=1
P (ωi),
where ω = e2πi/k is a principal kth root of unity.
See [40, 8.5.12 and 8.6.2-3] for a proof. In particular, #J(C) = P (1), and
applying (2) of Theorem 1 gives the Weil interval :
(3.3) (
√
q − 1)2g ≤ #J(C) ≤ (√q + 1)2g.
The Frobenius automorphism a → aq of the finite field Fq gives rise to a group
endomorphism on Jk(C), which we denote φq. The elements of Jk(C) fixed by
φq are precisely the subgroup J(C). When d divides k, we define Jk/d to be the
image of φdq − 1 on Jk, where 1 denotes the identity map. Thus Jk/d is a subgroup
of Jk(C) isomorphic to Jk(C)/Jd(C). We define the trace zero variety of Jk(C),
denoted Tk(C), to be the kernel of the group endomorphism
φk−1q + φ
k−2
q + · · ·+ 1.
Lemma 2. Let C be a curve defined over Fq. Then Jk/1(C) ⊆ Tk(C). Equality
holds when J(C) is k-torsion free.
Proof. To show inclusion, we factor φkq − 1 in the endomorphism ring of Jk(C):
Jk(C) = ker(φqk − 1) = ker(φkq − 1) = ker
[
(φq − 1)(φk−1q + · · ·+ 1)
]
.
The image of φq − 1 lies in the kernel of φk−1q + · · ·+ 1, hence Jk/1(C) ⊆ Tk(C).
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When J(C) is k-torsion free, J(C) ∩ Tk(C) is trivial and
#Jk(C) = #J(C)#Jk/1(C) ≤ #J(C)#Tk(C) ≤ #Jk(C),
implying equality. 
If Fq is a finite field of odd characteristic, we may define a hyperelliptic curve of
genus g as a projective plane curve C with affine part given by
y2 = f(x),
where f(x) ∈ Fq[x] has non-zero discriminant and degree d = 2g + 1 or 2g + 2.4 If
α ∈ Fq is a not a quadratic residue, the quadratic twist of C in Fq, denoted C˜, has
affine part αy2 = f(x), more conveniently expressed as
y2 = αdf(x/α).
Any choice of non-residue in Fq yields a curve isomorphic to C˜.
Lemma 3. Let C be a hyperelliptic curve with L-polynomial P (z).
(1) P (−z) is the L-polynomial of C˜; (2) J2/1(C) ∼= J(C˜).
Proof. Let N˜k count the points on C˜ in P(Fqk). For k even, N˜k = Nk, and for k
odd, Nk + N˜k = 2(q
k + 1). Applying (3) and (2) of Theorem 1 proves (1), and
Lemma 1 implies that #J2(C) = P (1)P (−1) = #J(C)#J(C˜). The curves C and
C˜ are isomorphic over Fq2 , thus we may regard J(C˜) as a subgroup of J2(C) that
intersects J(C) trivially. J2(C) is then the (internal) product of the subgroups
J(C) and J(C˜), hence J2/1(C) ∼= J2(C)/J(C) ∼= J(C˜). 
Finally, we note results that impact the effective security of hyperelliptic curves
[14, 16, 23, 24, 25, 54, 60, 61]. Taking a pessimistic view, we list the strongest
potential attacks known at the time of writing.
Proposition 1. Let C be a hyperelliptic curve of genus g over Fq = Fpn .
(1) Discrete logarithms in J(C) can be computed in time O(p2−4/(2ng+1)). [25]
(2) If J(C) is cyclic and g ≥ 3 discrete logarithms in J(C) can be computed in
time O˜(q2−2/g). Heuristically, J(C) need not be cyclic. [24]
(3) If C is a genus 2 curve, the discrete logarithm problem in the trace zero
variety T3(C) may be transferred to the Jacobian of genus 6 curve over Fq.
If #J2(C) is divisible by 3, the genus may be 5. [16]
Additionally, the explicit isogenies attack of [54] on genus 3 hyperelliptic curves
can (and should) be avoided by ensuring f(x) has exactly one irreducible factor of
degree 3, 5, or 7 over Fq. In light of (1), we consider the security of a genus 3 curve
C over Fp comparable to that of a genus 2 curve C
′ over Fp′ when
5
lg#J(C/Fp)/ lg #J(C
′/Fp′) = 9/8
(note p and p′ are different primes), and if C is a genus 2 curve over Fp2 we require
a ratio of 14/9. Considering (2) and (3), for the trace zero variety T (C/Fp3), the
comparable ratio is 5/4 when 3 divides #J(C/Fp2) and 6/5 otherwise.
See [11] and [35] for further background on hyperelliptic curve cryptography.
4The black boxes we use assume f is monic and d = 2g+1 but our results do not require this.
5We use “lg” to denote binary logarithms and “log” for the natural logarithm (the distinction
is immaterial here and in big-O notation, but may be relevant elsewhere).
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4. Algorithms
To compute #J(C), we apply a probabilistic generic algorithm that computes the
order (and structure) of an arbitrary finite abelian group G. We give an overview of
the general algorithm presented in [57], focusing on the components most relevant
to searching a family of Jacobians.
By convention, we use multiplicative notation for generic groups and let 1G
denote the group identity. For α ∈ G, we let |α| denote the order of α, the least
positive integer n for which αn = 1G, and call any multiple of |α| an exponent of
α. The order of G is denoted |G|, and λ(G) is the exponent of G, the least positive
integer which is an exponent of every element in G. Complexity metrics for generic
algorithms count group operations (time) and group elements (space).
We assume the availability of a black box that uniquely identifies group elements,
a requirement easily met by Jacobian arithmetic based on a Cantor-Mumford repre-
sentation [9]. We also require access to randomly generated group elements, which
may be obtained via the methods detailed in [11, 14.1-2]. We presuppose a uniform
distribution, however this assumption can typically be relaxed in practice.6
Central to our method for obtaining subexponential performance is the notion of
a conditional algorithm. Such an algorithm is given the option to explicitly reject
inputs that fail to satisfy a specified condition, but must otherwise behave correctly.
The condition we use here is based on the fact that for any group element α,
(4.1)
∣∣αE∣∣ = |α|
gcd(|α|, E) .
This may be used to reduce the size of |αE | relative to |α|, making it easier to
compute. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 1. Let E =
∏
q where q ranges over maximal prime-powers bounded
by B. A positive integer N for which N/ gcd(N,E) ≤ B2 is called B-easy, and
otherwise, B-hard.
A B-easy integer is semismooth with respect to B2 and B (prime factors bounded
by B2 and all but one by B). The converse holds if we apply the semismooth criteria
to prime-power factors.
Proposition 2. For any B > 0 there is a probabilistic generic algorithm A such
that the following hold for all finite abelian groups G:
(1) If A rejects, then |G| is B-hard; otherwise, with high probability,
A outputs λ(G), the structure of G, and |G|.
(2) The expected number of group operations is O(B) +O(lg2 |G|).
We say A computes |G| on the condition that |G| is B-easy. The probability and
expectation in Proposition 2 do not depend on G. By the structure of G, we mean
an explicit factorization of G into cyclic subgroups of known order with a generator
for each factor. The structure of G is computed using λ(G), to obtain |G|.
When tight bounds on |G| are known, as in the case of Jacobians, the fact that
λ(G) divides |G| may suffice to determine |G|, and the structure of G is not needed.
The time to compute |G| is typically dominated by the time to compute λ(G) in
any event; computing the group structure at worst increases the constant factors.
6For small groups, the simplest approach in [11] may not generate the entire Jacobian. De-
compression techniques ensure a uniform distribution (at slightly greater cost).
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If B ≥ |G|1/2 then |G| is certainly B-easy. By starting with a small value of B
and increasing it in stages, one obtains an O(N1/2) algorithm for computing the
structure of any finite abelian group. When |G| is a random integer, the median
complexity is O(N0.344). This approach can be much faster than other generic
algorithms for computing abelian group structure [6, 7, 58, 59].
To search for Jacobians, we estimate |G| ≈ 2n based on the Weil interval (3.3),
then pick a fixed B = 2n/u that minimizes B/σ(u), where σ(u) estimates the
probability that a random integer x is x1/u-easy. Asymptotically, we may use
σ(u) = G(1/u, 2/u), where G(s, t) is the semismooth probability function defined
by Bach and Peralta in [1] (the impact of prime-power factors is negligible). This
yields an L(1/2,
√
2/2) bound on both 1/σ(u) and B, leading to an L(1/2,
√
2)
bound on the entire search, based on the heuristic assumption that |G| has the
distribution of a random integer of comparable size.7
It remains to prove Proposition 2. We assume henceforth that B ≥ lg2 |G|.
Algorithm 1 (Group Order). Given a finite abelian group G and a bound B, on
the condition that |G| is B-easy:
1. Compute λ(G) on the condition that λ(G) is B-easy.
2. For each prime p|λ(G), compute the structure of Hp, the p-Sylow subgroup
of G, on the condition that |Hp| ≤ B2. (If |G| is found B-hard, reject).
Output λ(G), the structure of G, and |G|.
The algorithm for Step 2 is described in detail in [57, Algorithm 9.1]. Compu-
tation in Hp is accomplished via the black box for G, exponentiating by λ(G)/p
h
to obtain random elements of Hp (here p
h is the largest power of p dividing λ(G)).
Computing the structure of Hp uses O(
√|Hp|) group operations [57, Proposition
9.3]. The condition |Hp| ≤ B2 gives a complexity of O(B lg |G|) (entirely acceptable
in practice), however to prove Proposition 2, we reject whenever |G| is B-hard, as-
suring an O(B) bound. As noted above, Step 2 need not be implemented to search
for large Jacobians.
We now present the algorithm to compute λ(G), using two generic subroutines
that compute the order of a group element.
Algorithm 2 (Group Exponent). Given a finite abelian group G, a bound B, and
a constant c, let E =
∏
q, where q ≤ B ranges over prime powers, and set N ← 1.
On the condition that λ(G) is B-easy:
1. For a random α ∈ G, set α← αN , then compute β ← αE .
2. Compute N ′ = |β| on the condition that |β| ≤ B2.
3. Compute N ′′ = |αN ′ | with exponent E. Set N ← NN ′N ′′ and t← 1.
4. For a random α ∈ G, attempt to compute N ′ = |αN | with exponent E.
If a reject occurs, goto Step 1.
5. Set N ← NN ′ and increment t. If t < c then goto Step 4.
Output λ(G) = N .
7One uses σ(u) ≥ ρ(u) = u−u+o(1), where ρ(u) is the Dickman function [1, 8, 13].
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The order computation in Step 2 is a bounded search for |β| ≤ B2, which may be
performed by a standard birthday-paradox algorithm or by Algorithm 4 below. The
order computations in Steps 3 and 4 use Algorithm 3. In Step 3, E is necessarily an
exponent of αN
′
, since αN
′E = βN
′
= 1G. In Step 4, E might not be an exponent
of αN , causing Algorithm 3 to reject. We now show this rarely happens.
If Step 2 rejects, then |α| is B-hard and so is λ(G). Otherwise, we claim that
the integer λ(G)/|α| is B-powersmooth, with probability greater than 1−1/B. For
a uniformly random α ∈ G and a prime power ph dividing λ(G), we find that
(4.2) Pr
[
ph divides
λ(G)
|α|
]
≤ 1
ph
,
by considering a factorization of G into cyclic subgroups of prime-power order. If
λ(G)/|α| is not B-powersmooth, it must be divisible by a prime power greater than
B, and our claim is proven by (4.2). It follows that the expected complexity is
O(B) group operations, assuming an O(B) bound on each step.
The output value N is the least common multiple of the orders of c random
group elements–necessarily a divisor of λ(G). One can apply 4.2 to obtain
(4.3) Pr [N 6= λ(G)] < 1− 1
2c−2
,
as shown in [57, Proposition 8.3].
From the prime number theorem we find lgE ≈ (B/ logB) lgB = B/ log 2,
hence Step 1 can be accomplished with standard exponentiation techniques using
B/ log 2+ o(B) group operations. Step 2 can be performed by either of the generic
birthday-paradox algorithms using an expected O(B) group operations. We give a
more efficient method (Algorithm 4), but it is not needed for Proposition 2.
To complete the demonstration of the proposition, we need only show how to
compute |α| with an exponent E, using O(lgE) group operations.
Algorithm 3 (Linear Order). Given an integer E = q1q2 · · · qw factored into prime
powers and α ∈ G, let α0 = α. On the condition that αE = 1G:
(1) For i = 1 to w, compute αi ← αqii−1 until αi = 1G.
If this fails to occur then reject, otherwise set N ← |αi−1|.
(2) Do a binary search for the least j ∈ [0, i] for which αNj = 1G.
If j > 0 then set i← j − 1, N ← |αNi |N , and repeat Step 2.
Output |α| = N .
The correctness of the algorithm follows from the invariant N = |αi|. Each of
the assignments to N involves a prime-power order computation accomplished via
repeated exponentiation. The cost of Step 1 is at most m+ o(m) group operations,
where m = lgE. The cost of Step 2 may be bounded by O
(
(n2/ lgn) lgm
)
, where
n = lg |α| ≤ lg |G|. For m ≥ n2, the total complexity is O(m) = O(lgE). For
m≫ n2 it is at most m+ o(m), possibly much less.8
This completes our demonstration of Proposition 2.
Proposition 3. Algorithm A of Proposition 2 can be implemented using storage
for O(lg2 |G|) group elements.
8In Step 4 of Algorithm 4, |α| quickly becomes very smooth.
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Proof sketch. Pollard’s rho method can be used in Step 2 of Algorithm 1 and in Step
2 of Algorithm 2, using storage for O(log |G|) group elements. This also suffices for
all exponentiations (E need not be explicitly computed). As written, Algorithm 3
storesO(w) = O(B/ logB) group elements. When B/ logB > lg2 |G|, the space can
be made O(lg2 |G|) by saving only this many values of αi, recomputing as required,
with a negligible impact on time (see [57, Proposition 7.1] for details). 
When searching for B-easy groups, it is typically not necessary to constrain
space to this extent. The chosen bound B is L(1/2,
√
2/2) in terms of N = |G|
(unconditionally), and the space will be O(B) (or better) even if a rho search is not
used. The algorithm described below is significantly faster than a rho search, and
in practice the space requirements are moderate (see Section 6).
A Parallel Primorial-Steps Algorithm. The primorial-steps algorithm [57]
computes the order of an element in a generic group. It is asymptotically faster
than the standard Θ(
√
N) birthday-paradox algorithms, with an improvement of
Θ(
√
log logN). In practice the gain is a factor of two or three in both time and
space over a standard baby-steps giant-steps implementation. We present a parallel
version of the algorithm, designed for black boxes that can perform parallel group
operations more quickly (typically by combining inversions in an underlying field).
A parallel algorithm is well suited to a multi-processor environment, but our
primary motivation here is to speed up the group operation in a single thread of
execution. The resulting algorithm remains generic. The performance improvement
depends on the black box, but can be substantial (see Table 1).
As above, our approach is based on (4.1). Given α ∈ G, we use exponentiation
by a suitable E to remove small primes from |αE |, enabling an optimized baby-steps
giant-steps search. When B = 1000, we use E = 219 · 312 · 58 · 77, and compute
β = αE . Assuming that |α| ≤ B2, the integer N = |β| is then relatively prime to
the primorial P4 = 2 · 3 · 5 · 7 = 210. In general, we choose a primorial P = Pw and
a positive integer m, so that
m2Pϕ(P ) ≥ B2,
where ϕ(P ) is Euler’s function. We compute mϕ(P ) baby steps βb for each b ∈
[1,mP ] relatively prime to Pw, and a similar number of giant steps β
mPa for a from
1 to ϕ(P ). Since any integer N ≤ B2 may be written in the form
N = mPa− b,
one of our baby steps must match one of our giant steps. In our example, we let
m = 10 and use 480 baby steps followed by 477 giant steps. We require some
additional group operations to compute β = αE and the values β2, β4, . . . , β10
needed to span the gaps between integers relatively prime to P4. The total is about
half the 2000 group operations used in a standard baby-steps giant-steps search, and
the space is similarly reduced. In general the improvement is a factor of
√
P/ϕ(P ),
and for a suitable P , one obtains an asymptotic complexity of O(B/
√
log logB).9
Applying optimized baby-step giant-step methods given constraints on |β| is not
new; this technique is often used in conjunction with ℓ-adic methods, as in [41].
The novelty here is that the constraints are obtained generically.
In the example above we could have used P5 rather than P4, and set m to 1.
We intentionally use a slightly suboptimal value of P and a larger value of m to
9This generalizes to an unbounded search for N = |α| with complexity O(
p
N/ log logN) [57].
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facilitate a parallel implementation. Rather than a single sequence of baby steps,
we use m sequences, each spanning a range of P powers of β using ϕ(P ) group
operations. We similarly use m suitably spaced sequences of ϕ(P ) giant steps.
To incorporate the usual optimization for fast inverses, we double the spacing
between giant steps. We now choose m and P = Pw satisfying
2m2Pϕ(P ) ≥ B2,
and assume these values are precomputed, along with the value E =
∏w
i=1 p
hi
i ,
where pi is the ith prime and p
hi
i ≤ B2 < phi+1i .
We also precompute a wheel for the primorial P , a sequence r(n) with the prop-
erty that 1 +
∑n
j=1 r(j) gives the (n + 1)st positive integer relatively prime to P ,
for n from 1 to ϕ(P ). The wheel for P3 = 30 is the sequence (6,4,2,4,2,4,6,2). The
value rmax denotes the largest element of the sequence r(n). To obtain greater
flexibility in the choice of m, one can use P = tPw and “roll” the wheel t times in
Step 3 below. For simplicity we assume P = Pw.
Algorithm 4 (Primorial-Steps). Given α ∈ G and a bound B, let m, P , E, and
r(n) be as above, and let B and G be empty sets. On the condition |α| ≤ B2:
1. Compute β0 ← αE and δi = βi0, for even i from 2 to rmax.
Compute βi ← βP0 βi−1, for i from 1 to m− 1. Let ~β = (β0, . . . , βm−1).
2. Compute γ0 ← βmP0 and δ0 = γ20 .
Compute γi = γ
2ϕ(P )
0 γi−1, for i from 1 to m− 1. Let ~γ = (γ0, . . . , γm−1).
3. Set k ← 1 and for i from 0 to m− 1, set B ← B ∪ (βi, i, k).
For j from 1 to ϕ(P )− 1: compute ~β ← ~βδr(j), set k ← k + r(j),
and for i from 0 to m− 1, set B ← B ∪ (βi, i, k).
4. If (1G, i, k) ∈ B, minimize N = Pi+ k over such tuples and goto Step 6.
5. Set k ← 0, then for i from 0 to m− 1 set G ← G ∪ (γi, i, k).
For k from 1 to ϕ(P )− 1: compute ~γ ← ~γδ0,
and for i from 0 to m− 1, set G ← G ∪ (γi, i, k)
6. Find the least N = a± b corresponding to γβ±1 = 1G,
where a = 2mP (ϕ(P )i1 + k1) and b = Pi2 + k2,
for some (γ, i1, k1) ∈ G and (β, i2, k2) ∈ B.
If no such N exists, reject.
7. Compute N ′ = |αN | with exponent E and set N ← NN ′.
Output N = |α|.
In a parallel search, the first match found doesn’t necessarily give the order of
β0 (we could find a multiple of |β0|), hence the minimization of N . In a standard
implementation we don’t explicitly construct the set G, rather we check for a match
in B as each giant step is computed. This allows early termination when successful,
provided we handle the case that N is a multiple of |β0|. We can determine |β0|
using the (factored) exponent N before proceeding to Step 7.
In the present application there is good reason to explicitly compute G and
perform the matching process in Step 6, as shown. We expect the search to fail
in most cases, so this doesn’t materially impact the time. It doubles the space
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required, but space is not a limiting factor and there are other ways to reduce it.
The tuples in B and G needn’t store entire group elements (a small hash value
suffices) and B may be chosen judiciously (see Table 3).10
The advantage of computing both B and G explicitly is that it allows matching
to be performed more efficiently (it also enables greater parallelism). When the
group operation is extremely fast, the implementation of the lookup table used in
a baby-steps giant-steps search can have a significant impact on the running time.
On our test platform, the fastest black boxes achieve execution times close to the
latency of general memory access. If we defer matching until the end it can be done
more quickly, with better locality of reference, as described in Section 5.
4.1. Recovering the zeta function. Having computed #J(C), we need to de-
termine the zeta function of C. This problem (and many others) is discussed in
[17]. We provide explicit details here for the genus 2 and 3 cases and analyze the
cost of determining the zeta function once #J(C) is known.
Lemma 4. Let P (z) denote the L-polynomial of a non-singular, irreducible, pro-
jective curve C of genus g ≤ 3 defined over Fq. For sufficiently large q, the values
P (1) and P (−1) uniquely determine the coefficients of P (z) =∑2gi=0 aizi.
Proof. Recall that a0 = 1 and a2g−i = q
g−iai for 0 ≤ i < g (Theorem 1). If
g ≤ 2 then a1 = [P (1)− P (−1)] /[2(q + 1)], and for 2 ≤ g ≤ 3, we find that
a2 =
[
P (1) + P (−1)− 2(p2 + 1)] /2. This proves the lemma for g ≤ 2. For g = 3,
a1 =
P (1)− P (−1) + 2a3
2(q2 + 1)
= A1 + δ1,
where A1 is fixed and |δ1| <
(
6
3
)
q−1/2, by the bounds in (3.2). If q ≥ 402 then
|δ1| < 1/2 and the integer a1 is determined, fixing a3 as well. 
To determine P (−1), we compute #J2/1(C) = P (1)P (−1)/P (1) (Lemma 1).
For hyperelliptic curves, we may equivalently compute #J(C˜) (Lemma 3). In the
non-hyperelliptic case we can compute in J2/1(C) via group operations in J2(C),
using exponentiation by P (1) to obtain elements of J2/1(C).
11
For simplicity, we assume C is hyperelliptic. In genus 2 we have
a1 =
P (1)− (q2 + 1)− a2
q + 1
=
P (1)− (q2 + 1)
q + 1
− a2
q + 1
= A1 + δ1,
where the bounds in (3.2) imply |δ1| <
(
4
2
)
. There are at most eleven possible
values for the integer a1. The corresponding values P (−1) = P (1) − 2(q + 1)a1
form an arithmetic sequence with difference 2(q + 1). To distinguish the correct
P (−1), we generate a random α ∈ J(C˜) and step through the sequence, computing
powers of α. If only one exponent of α is found then we have determined P (−1)
(usually the case). Otherwise we compute |α| using a suitable exponent (e.g., the
gcd of all exponents found). By repeating this process we determine λ(J(C˜)) and,
if necessary, apply Step 2 of Algorithm 1 to compute #J(C˜) = P (−1).
10In fact, explicit computation of B and G enables searches that are effectively unlimited by
RAM–they can be efficiently migrated to disk and matched via a merge or radix sort.
11If d = gcd(P (1), P (−1)) > 1, we lose d-torsion elements of J2/1(C) when we do this, but the
resulting subgroup will usually be large enough for our purposes.
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We use a similar approach in genus 3, and assume q > 1640. We then have
a1 =
P (1)− (q3 + 1)− (q + 1)a2 − a3
q2 + 1
= A1 + δ1,
with |δ1| <
(
6
2
)
+ 1/2, giving 31 possibilities for a1. Given P (1) and a1, we find
a2 =
P (1)− (q3 + 1)− (q2 + 1)a1 − a3
(q + 1)
= A2 + δ2,
with |δ2| <
(
6
3
)
q1/2. The corresponding P (−1) values are given by
P (−1) = 2(q3 + 1)− P (1) + 2(q + 1)a2,
and we now have 31 arithmetic sequences for P (−1), each with a difference of
2(q + 1) and length less than 40q1/2. For a random α ∈ J(C˜) we can search for
exponents of α among all these sequences simultaneously using a baby-steps giant-
steps search (but not a primorial-steps search). We compute roughly
√
1240q1/2
consecutive powers of β = α2(q+1) (baby steps), followed by a similar number of
giant steps suitably spaced among the 31 sequences. This can be implemented using
parallel group operations, as in Algorithm 4.
The total number of group operations is O(q1/4) in genus 3. In terms of the
group size N ≈ qg, this is O(N1/12), with a leading constant factor of about 70.
Given the heuristically subexponential time required to find #J(C), the O(N1/12)
term is asymptotically dominant, but for practical values of N this is not the case.
Even for N as large as 2256, given #J(C), the time to recover the zeta function is
entirely tractable in genus 3 (perhaps a few minutes).
With modification, this approach can be applied in higher genera, but the run-
ning time becomes more significant. In genus 4 the complexity is O(N3/16) group
operations, and in general the complexity is Ω(N (g−1)(g−2)/(8g)). Extensions to
Kedlaya’s algorithm [5, 30] compute the zeta function of a curve in O˜(p1/2) time,
giving an O˜(N1/(2g)) algorithm. This is slightly faster than our method in genus 4,
and the advantage grows quickly in higher genera.
5. Implementation
We mention a few implementation details that may be relevant to those wishing
to replicate our results. Our implementation platform was a 2.5GHz AMD Athlon
64 processor (dual core) with 2GB of memory, running a 64-bit Linux operating
system. We ran eight of these systems in parallel in the larger tests. The algorithms
were implemented using the GNU C compiler [55] and the GMP multi-precision
arithmetic library [29].
Black Boxes. The parallel group operation enabled by Algorithm 4 is most advan-
tageous to a black box based on an affine representation of the Jacobian. We used
modified versions of Algorithms 14.19-21 (genus 2) and Algorithms 14.52-53 (genus
3) in [11]. The black box executes several group operations up to the point where
a field inversion is required, performs a single combined field inversion using Mont-
gomery’s trick [10], then completes the group operations. With this approach the
amortized cost of a field inversion is 3 field multiplications (3M), and the effective
cost of a group operation is then 28M in genus 2 and 74M in genus 3.
The prime field arithmetic was implemented in C except for two in-line assembly
directives, one to compute the 128-bit product of two 64-bit values and one to
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perform a 128-bit addition. The field multiplications for the Mersenne primes
261−1 and 289−1 were specifically optimized, but otherwise we used a Montgomery
representation [44], and Montgomery inversion was used in all cases (see [11] and
[42] for algorithms). Performance metrics appear in Table 1.
Parallel exponentiation. Both asymptotically and in practice, the exponentia-
tion performed in Step 1 of Algorithm 2 dominates the total running time. To
obtain the performance improvements offered by parallel group operations, we ex-
ponentiate in parallel for several curves defined over the same field.12 The exponent
E does not change once B is chosen, so it should be precomputed and put into a
convenient form (a 2k-ary sliding representation was used in our tests). The ex-
ponentiation takes more than twice as long as the search step, so it is convenient
to have two threads performing exponentiations on a dual processor, feeding their
results to a single search thread running in parallel.
Choosing the bound B = 2n/u. Given the comments above, we might search to
a bound greater than B2, balancing the time between exponentiation and searching.
The behavior of the semismooth probability function G(1/u, 1/v) argues against
this, as small changes in v have little impact. In fact, the optimal choice of v is
slightly above 2/u, implying a bound less than B2, but the difference is negligible.
The quantity 2n/u/σ(u) is insensitive to small changes in u close to the optimal
value. We can choose a slightly smaller u without materially impacting the running
time, obtaining a substantially smaller B = 2n/u, which saves space. As seen in
Table 3, one can reduce space by more than a factor of two while increasing the
time by only 5%.
Eliminating 2-torsion. One can efficiently filter a family of hyperelliptic curves
of the form y2 = f(x) to remove curves whose Jacobian has even order by testing
whether f(x) is an irreducible polynomial in Fp[x]. This is well worth doing if one
is interested in the group J2/1(C) = J(C˜), since #J(C) and J#(C˜) must have
the same parity, but otherwise the situation is less clear. As shown in Table 2,
while the probability of finding groups with near-prime order generally increases
when #J(C) is odd, the probability that #J(C) is B-easy goes down, more than
offsetting the increase in many cases. Note that it is possible for any of the groups
J4/2(C), J3/1(C) and J3/1(C˜) to have prime order even when #J(C) is even.
Efficient matching. In the description of Algorithm 4, the sets B and G contain
tuples (α, i, k), where α ∈ G is a baby-step or a giant-step. It is not necessary to
store α. It can be recovered using i and k by exponentiating β0 or γ0, which are
known to the algorithm. Asymptotically, a uniform hash value of lgB(lg lgB)1+ǫ
bits suffices to keep the cost of matching negligible. In practice, lgB is less than
30, the values i and k require a total of lgB bits, and we use a (64− lgB)-bit hash
value to make a 64-bit value for each tuple. This is about one third the size of a
compressed group element.
When using a fast inverse optimization, it is helpful if an element and its inverse
hash to the same value. This allows detection of both the cases γβ = 1G and
γβ−1 = 1G, without requiring extra table entries. To localize memory access, a
merge sort or (better) a radix sort may be used to find matches [34, 5.2.4-5]. We
used a partial radix sort with a radix of 29 or 210.
12For families of curves where the field varies, one might include 100 curves per field.
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6. Examples
For ease of illustration, we use parameterized families of curves with small co-
efficients. This choice is arbitrary, as is the choice of finite field. In practice, one
might choose a family of curves whose coefficients admit a particularly efficient
implementation, as suggested by Bernstein [4].
Genus 3 examples. We use the family of hyperelliptic curves defined by
y2 = x7 + 3x5 + x4 + 4x3 + x2 + 5x+ t
over the prime field Fp, with p = 2
50−27. As we are interested in groups J(C) with
near-prime order, we don’t try to compute #J(C) directly. Instead, we attempt
to compute #J(C˜) for each curve in our family, using Algorithm 1 (with random
coefficients, twisting is unnecessary). When successful, we apply the method de-
scribed in Section 4.1 to recover the L-polynomial of C˜ using P˜ (1) = #J(C˜). We
then compute #J(C) = P˜ (−1) = P (1).
Given the bound B, Algorithm 1 succeeds if #J(C˜) is B-easy (Definition 1). To
choose B, we make the heuristic assumption that #J(C˜) is a random n-bit integer,
where n = lg#J(C˜) ≈ 150. We pick u to minimize 2n/u/σ(u) and set B = 2n/u.
For n = 150, we choose u = 6.25 and find σ(u) ≈ 1/1765. (Table 3).
Algorithm 1 uses B/ log 2+ o(B) group operations, about 36 million in this case
(Table 4). The genus 3 black box performs roughly 1.8 million group operations
per second (Table 1), and the CPU time per curve is about 20 seconds on a 2.5
GHz AMD Athlon-64. This chip has two processors, so on a single PC we test a
curve every 10 seconds. We achieve our first success when t = 648 and find
#J(C˜) = 23 · 52 · 233 · 937 · 8053 · 18719 · 44171 · 1180799 · 13517389 · 307558308259.
Given #J(C˜), it takes only 300,000 group operations (0.2 seconds) to determine
the zeta function of C, whose L-polynomial P (z) has coefficients
a1 = 39141148, a2 = 1354965780525799, a3 = 18939879984661962930696.
We then compute
#J(C) = P (1) = 23 · 3 · 1083611 · 54880077749424473770842486727458448993.
This value isn’t quite near prime, but it could have been; see Section 6 for a prime
example. The average time required to successfully compute #J(C) for some curve
in our family is about four hours on a single PC, somewhat better than σ(u) would
suggest (we generally find our heuristic assumption pessimistic). The memory
requirements are modest, about 200MB in this case, and in our largest tests, about
1GB. Memory usage can be substantially reduced with a small (< 5%) impact on
performance (see Table 3).13 We optimized for time.
We tested similar families of curves with p = 3 · 1016 + 29 (164-bit group size)
and p = 261 − 1 (183-bit group size). Sample results are given in Table 6. In the
first case it took about a day per success on a single PC, and in the second, slightly
over four days. We used eight PCs, succeeding roughly twice a day in the larger
test. Distributed computation not only increases the throughput, it gives a linear
speedup in the time to achieve the first success for up to O(1/σ(u)) processors.
After an initial partitioning of the family of curves, no communication is required,
making a distributed implementation straightforward.
13By Proposition 3, the space can be made O(lg2#J(C)), but with a larger impact on time.
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It is entirely feasible to find cryptographically suitable genus 3 Jacobians using
this approach. However, the genus 2 case is more attractive, as we can find groups
offering better security in much less time.
Genus 2 curves (1). We first consider the family of curves defined by
y2 = x5 + 2x3 + 7x2 + x+ t
over the prime field Fp with p = 2
61 − 1. We don’t twist our initial family of
curves, as we are not interested in the group J2/1(C) = J(C˜), but rather the other
three groups listed in (2.2). In this case n = lg#J(C) ≈ 122 and we let u = 5.8,
obtaining B = 2n/u ≈ 221 and σ(u) ≈ 1/549.
Algorithm 1 now uses about 4.6 million group operations per curve and the
black box performs over 4 million group operations per second. The CPU time per
curve is under 1.1 seconds, so we test about two curves per second and expect to
successfully compute #J(C) roughly every five minutes on a single PC.
For each value of #J(C), we recover P (z) and, applying Lemma 1, compute
#J3/1(C) = P (ω)P (ω
2),
#J3/1(C˜) = P (−ω)P (−ω2),
#J4/2(C) = P (i)P (−i),
where ω = e2πi/3. If any of these are near prime, we may have found a crypto-
graphically suitable group.14 The first case where we succeed in computing #J(C)
occurs when t = 816, and we find that the P (z) has coefficients a1 = 618350030
and a2 = 415833882783789026. The most interesting value is
#J3/1(C) = P (ω)P (−ω) = 52 · 547 · P231,
where P231 is a 231-bit prime. In this case J3/1(C) is equal to the trace zero variety
T3(C). Even after taking Proposition 1 into account, which reduces the effective
security of Jacobians over extension fields, this is well into cryptographic range.
The next interesting case occurs on our fifth success, when t = 3909. We find
#J4/2(C) = P (i)P (−i) = 412 · P234.
This is the order of J2(C˜2) where C˜2 is the quadratic twist of C in Fp2 . This curve
may be written as
y2 = x5 + 2α2x3 + 7α3x2 + α4x+ 3909α5,
where α is any non-residue in Fp2 . On our eleventh successful computation, when
t = 6005, we find
#J3/1(C˜) = P (−ω)P (−ω2) = 4 · P242,
giving a group with security comparable to a 194-bit genus 2 Jacobian of prime
order over a prime field.
The total time to reach this point is about 50 minutes, a typical scenario. If
we are willing to wait a bit longer, we can find many groups with prime order,
including cases where both #J3/1(C) and #J3/1(C˜) are prime (Table 5). On a
64-bit platform, computation in either J2(C) or a trace zero variety T3(C) with
p = 261 − 1 will likely be faster than in a Jacobian over a larger prime field with
comparable security.
14In this example #J4/2(C) is not quite large enough. We include it for the sake of illustration.
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Genus 2 curves (2). We tested genus 2 curves over three larger fields. In the
first test we used the family of curves defined by
y2 = x5 + x+ t
over the prime field Fp, with p = 2
84 − 35. For u = 6.5 it takes about 34 hours per
success on a single PC with #J(C) ≈ 2168. We computed the order of 43 Jacobians,
finding 11 groups with near-prime order, including:
(1) The Jacobian of the curve y2 = x5 + x + 127861 over Fp has near-prime
order, with a 160-bit prime factor and a cofactor of 288.
(2) The trace zero variety of the curve y2 = x5+x+89993 over Fp3 has 336-bit
prime order.
Our second test used the same family of curves with p = 289 − 1. With u = 6.7
it takes about 4 days per success per PC with #J(C) ≈ 2178. We computed the
order of 31 Jacobians, again finding 11 groups with near-prime order, including:
(1) The Jacobian of the curve y2 = x5 + x + 202214 over Fp has near-prime
order, with a 171-bit prime factor and a cofactor of 180.
(2) The Jacobian of the curve y2 = x5+α4x+207686α5 over Fp2 has near-prime
order, with a 349-bit prime factor and a cofactor of 169.
(3) The trace zero variety of the curve y2 = x5 + 81x+ 15466464 over Fp3 has
near-prime order, with a 354-bit prime and a cofactor of 7.
Our largest test used p = 293−25. We computed the order of a 186-bit Jacobian,
finding a 372-bit trace zero variety of near-prime order for the curve
y2 = x5 + 2x3 + 3x2 + 5x+ 1050.
See Table 5 for the zeta functions of all the curves mentioned above.
7. Conclusion
For general families of genus 2 and genus 3 curves, efficiently finding crypto-
graphically suitable Jacobians over prime fields remains a challenge. Our method
substantially increases the size of Jacobians whose order can be effectively com-
puted, and is feasible at the low end of the cryptographic range. In a distributed
implementation, 200-bit group sizes are within reach. As our algorithm does not
use ℓ-adic or p-adic methods, a combined approach may offer further improvement.
Given a family of genus 2 curves defined over a prime field, we can find crypto-
graphically suitable groups over low degree extension fields efficiently on a single
PC. Groups offering security comparable to 200-bit genus 2 Jacobians over prime
fields are easily obtained (about an hour), and the time required to achieve 250-bit
security levels is not unreasonable (a day or two). Trace zero varieties, in particular,
appear to offer an attractive combination of performance and security.
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Black Box |Fp| lg |G| ×1 ×100 E S
Genus 2 250 − 27 100 1.49 4.26 4.07 3.42
261 − 1 122 1.35 4.81 4.76 3.82
284 − 35 168 0.66 1.85 1.78 1.68
289 − 1 178 0.67 2.11 2.01 1.87
294 − 3 188 0.62 1.83 1.76 1.63
Genus 3 1311 + 34 122 1.12 1.84 1.86 1.62
250 − 27 150 1.02 1.83 1.85 1.67
3 · 1016 + 29 164 0.98 1.83 1.85 1.67
261 − 1 183 0.92 1.83 1.85 1.68
Table 1. Black Box Performance for Prime Fields
The last four columns list average performance in millions of group operations per second.
The column “×1” indicates operations performed singly and “×100” indicates operations
performed in batches of 100. These figures are for random additions; doubling is ≈ 5%
slower in genus 2 and ≈ 2% faster in Genus 3. All values are for single-threaded execution.
The columns E and S show the throughput of the exponentiation (E) and primorial-steps
search (S) performed by Algorithm 2. Values were obtained by dividing the elapsed time
of a single thread (including all overhead) by the number of group operations.
n u Pr[A] Pr[B2/1|A] Pr[B4/2|A] Pr[B3/1|A] Pr[B˜3/1|A]
48 2.0 100 4.4 3.8 5.4 5.4
48 3.0 48 3.8 3.6 5.1 5.3
48 4.0 11 3.1 3.4 4.8 5.1
100 5.4 0.57 4.1 4.1 5.2 5.1
100 5.4 0.58 4.1 4.0 4.8 5.2
48 2.0 100 8.2 6.6 6.3 6.3
48 3.0 40 7.7 6.6 6.0 6.2
48 4.0 7.8 7.2 6.5 5.9 6.1
100 5.4 0.44 6.5 5.6 5.6 5.2
100 5.4 0.44 6.9 5.6 5.3 4.9
Table 2. Jacobian Order Distributions in Genus 2 (percent)
The event A occurs when #J(C) ≈ 2n is 2n/u-easy (Definition 1). The event Ba/b occurs
when #Ja/b(C) contains a prime factor at least 95% the size of #Ja/b(C). For a random
integer, the probability of this event is ∼ log(20/19) ≈ 5.1%.
Each row reflects a dataset of 106 Jacobians, with the bottom datasets containing only
Jacobians with odd order (no 2-torsion). The datasets for n = 48 used curves with random
coefficients over a field Fp with the prime p ∈ [2
24
− 216, 224 +216] chosen at random. The
datasets for n = 100 used a fixed prime p = 250− 27 with either random curve coefficients
(first entry), or the parameterized family y2 = x5 + 2x3 + 7x2 + x+ t (second entry).
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n w u 1/σ(u) B E S E + S (E + S)/σ(u) 16S
100 5 5.38 195 .39 .60 .25 .85 1.7× 102 4
110 5 5.57 309 .88 1.3 .57 1.9 5.9× 102 9
120 5 5.75 484 1.9 2.9 1.2 4.1 2.0× 103 20
130 6 5.92 745 4.1 6.3 2.5 8.7 6.5× 103 40
140 6 6.01 936 10 16 6.4 22 2.0× 104 102
150 6 6.25 1765 17 25 10 36 6.3× 104 166
160 6 6.40 2640 34 50 21 71 1.9× 105 333
170 7 6.55 3972 65 97 39 136 5.4× 105 625
180 7 6.70 6012 122 183 74 256 1.5× 106 1176
190 7 6.84 8897 230 344 138 482 4.3× 106 2212
200 7 7.01 14355 388 579 233 812 1.2× 107 3728
180 6 7.01 14355 54 80 33 114 1.6× 106 532
190 7 7.14 20943 102 153 62 215 4.5× 106 985
200 7 7.27 30553 191 286 115 401 1.2× 107 1838
Table 3. Search Parameter Estimates (millions)
The value n is an estimate of lg #J(C), w indicates the primorial Pw in Algorithm 4,
and the parameter u minimizes (E + S)/σ(u), where σ(u) = G(1/u, 2/u) estimates the
probability that a random integer N ≈ 2n is B-easy. The value B = 2n/u is listed in
millions, as are the remaining five columns.
The values E = B/ log 2 and S =
p
2Pw/ϕ(Pw)B estimate the group operations required
for exponentiation (E) and a primorial-steps search (S) with parameter B. Their sum
approximates the group operations used by Algorithm 1 in an unsuccessful attempt to
compute #J(C), and (E+S)/σ(u) is a heuristic estimate of the average number of group
operations required per successful computation of #J(C).
The last column estimates the memory used by Algorithm 4 assuming both sets B and
G are explicitly computed, using 64 bits per tuple (see Section 5). The last three rows
show the impact of increasing u to reduce space. If only B is stored, the figures in the last
column should be divided by 2.
Genus n u 1/r E + S (E + S)/r
2 100 5.38 172 (-12%) .87 (+2%) 1.5× 102 (-10%)
2 122 5.80 483 (-12%) 4.7 (+2%) 2.3× 103 (-11%)
3 122 5.80 435 (-21%) 4.8 (+3%) 2.1× 103 (-18%)
3 150 6.25 1587 (-20%) 36 (+1%) 5.7× 103 (-8%)
2 168 6.50 3448 (-0%) 129 (+2%) 4.5× 103 (+2%)
2 178 6.70 5263 (-12%) 213 (+2%) 1.1× 106 (-10%)
Table 4. Actuals vs. Estimates (millions)
The value r is the actual success rate achieved. The first three tests used 106 curves, while
the last three used 105. Deviations from estimates are shown in parentheses.
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C : y2 = x5 + x+ 456579, p = 261 − 1
a1 = 867588246, a2 = 503655589160075568
#J3/1(C) and #J3/1(C˜) are 244-bit primes, #J2(C) not divisible by 3.
C : y2 = x5 + x+ 127861, p = 284 − 35
a1 = −2092369310828, a2 = 35830907425009491385101310
#J(C) = 25 · 32 · 1299112566516217620665269205633002367450315129777
C : y2 = x5 + x+ 89993, p = 284 − 35
a1 = 1236014582768, a2 = −20956811918028115290034218
#J3/1(C) is a 336-bit prime, #J2(C) not divisible by 3.
C : y2 = x5 + x+ 202214, p = 289 − 1
a1 = −52033004229306, a2 = 1618004552234213280766854490
#J(C) = 22 · 32 · 5 · 2128466028980222265110760419187916380742710181533203
C : y2 = x5 + x+ 207686, p = 289 − 1
a1 = 37333142265075, a2 = 1342175488412716989278850463
#J(C˜2) = 13
2 · P349 where P349 is a 349-bit prime.
C : y2 = x5 + 81x+ 15466464, p = 289 − 1
a1 = −29105979141185, a2 = 216189507687913446441772723
#J3/1(C) = 7 · P354, where P354 is a 354-bit prime, #J2(C) not divisible by 3.
C : y2 = x5 + 2x3 + 3x2 + 5x+ 1050, p = 293 − 25
a1 = 20868893099084, a2 = 14008940235908131442826126566
#J3/1(C) = 7 · 313 · P361, where P361 is a 361-bit prime, #J2(C) divisible by 3.
Table 5. Genus 2 Examples
The curve C˜2 is the quadratic twist of C over Fp2 .
C : y2 = x7 + 3x5 + x4 + 4x3 + x2 + 5x+ 851385, p = 250 − 27
a1 = 13792821, a2 = 98748931364073,
a3 = −4912096020329124903571
#J(C) = 1427247710190335132030763894493884791800228867
C : y2 = x7 + 28x3 + 18x2 + 27x+ 69621, p = 3 · 1016 + 29
a1 = −200710015, a2 = 49691549823351179,
a3 = −9387711520293250802133155
#J(C) = 52 · 373 · 2895442339877862336809237112865944284512053683
C : y2 = x7 + 3x5 + x4 + 4x3 + x2 + 5x+ 84538, p = 261 − 1
a1 = −255251897, a2 = 3731171990845206887,
a3 = −1915761422452218541377951998
#J(C) = 24 · 35 · 17 · 223 · 831781325652289358544190241299568732364985371373
Table 6. Genus 3 Examples
See http://math.mit.edu/~drew/ for additional examples and verification details.
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